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When states restrict health services for disabled residents to
institutional settings instead of providing equally effective
community-based services, they run afoul of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).' This was the essential holding of the 1999
case of Olmstead v. L. C.2 Considered a landmark civil rights decision
for residents who have disabilities, 3 Olmstead held that restrictive
treatment regimes that confine the disabled to institutional settings
without medical justification constitute a form of segregation that the
ADA prohibits.4 Under the ADA, states have a general obligation to
provide services in the "most integrated setting" appropriate to
disabled individuals, and to avoid reliance upon excessive
institutionalization policies in their health programs.
5
Olmstead has been heralded as the Brown v. Board of Education
for people with disabilities residing in state psychiatric hospitals,
institutions for mental retardation,6 and nursing homes.7 The analogy
* Elliott Schwalb, J.D. graduated from New York University School of Law, J.D. 1992 and is a
member of the New York and Georgia Bar. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone,
and do not necessarily represent the views of any other entity or agency. This article is dedicated to
Celeste Saul Jenks, Georgia State University College of Law (Class of 2003), who, through her personal
example, inspired her many friends and colleagues throughout her brief life; and to Meg. This article
was greatly enhanced by the generous efforts and insightful comments of the following individuals:
Therese M. Day, Elisa Roberts, Professor Randall Hughes, Steven Schwartz and John Bayne.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (2006)).
2. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
3. See, e.g., Mary C. Cereto, Olmstead: The Brown v. Board of Education for Disability Rights:
Promises, Limits, and Issues, 3 LOY. J. PuB. INT. L. 47 (2001); Melody Kubo, Case Note, Implementing
Olmostead v. L.C.: Defining "Effectively Working" Plans for Reasonably Paced Wait Lists for Medicaid
Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Programs, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 731 (2001).
4. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600-01.
5. Id. at581,607.
6. Often denoted as "ICF-MRs" [Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded].
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 803 2009-2010
I IN  IN . II:   
    - SED 




t lt    t   
l     i  
se    
  ).I      
  ?  r    
ilities/  
t   
i l ti     i   
 4  ,   ti   
 t    
   
li ti  li i s in their health programs.5 
      ti n 
   , 
6 7  
• Elliott Schwalb, J.D. graduated from New York University School of Law, J.D. 1992 and is a 
    '  , 
    . i  ti l  i  i t  t  
t   n  it  1e  l 
l1   
  l1  i i i l : 
  al1  
.      . . .  , t . ». 
 ). 
. ,   .   ti  f  i ility i t : 
ises, its, s, lo  i   
ste   l / l   ts/  
  rams, . w .  I . 
. stead,  
d.  5  607. 
s"  t l1  
803 
1
Schwalb: Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii:  The Right of Medicaid Beneficiari
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to Brown may be particularly apt in that, like Brown, the actual
progress in deinstitutionalization of health facilities has fallen far
short of its initial promise.8 One primary reason that progress in
deinstitutionalization has stalled arises from outside the ADA itself
and relates to Medicaid's community-based waiver program, a
primary mode of health care relied upon by disabled individuals.
Medicaid's community-based waiver program is a service that allows
individuals qualifying for institutional care under Medicaid to receive
their care in their homes or in the community as an alternative. The
current state of the law has largely been shaped by a case that arose in
the Federal District Court in Hawaii, 9 Makin v. Hawaii, the subject of
this article. Makin has had a substantial persuasive impact that has
limited the growth of services under Medicaid's community-based
waiver program and stymied the nation's deinstitutionalization
efforts. The analysis and holding of Makin has received strong
support from a number of subsequent decisions from across the
country, including federal appellate decisions in four circuits, without
any explicitly contrary decisions. 10 This article seeks to show that,
despite reflecting the current state of the law, Makin's analysis is
ultimately unpersuasive and its analysis and holding should be
rejected.
I. THE MAKIN V. HA WAii DECISION
A. Background and Factual Context
In terms of complexity and cost, Medicaid stands apart from the
other programs that made up President Johnson's "Great Society"
7. Cereto, supra note 3; Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsberg and the Judicial Role in Expanding
"We the People": The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49 (2004).
8. K. Charlie Lakin, Robert Pouty, Barbara Polister & Kathryn Coucouvanis, States' Initial
Response to the President's New Freedom Initiative: Slowest Rates of Deinstitutionalization in 30 Years,
42 MENTAL RETARDATION 241 (2004). The New Freedom Initiative, promulgated under Executive
Order 13217, directed the Executive branch to undertake "swift implementation of the Olmstead
decision." Id.; Mark S. Salzer, Kat Kaplan & Joanne Atay, State Psychiatric Hospital Census After the
1999 Olmstead Decision: Evidence of Decelerating Deinstitutionalization, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
1501 (2006).
9. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Haw. 1999).
10. See infra notes 42-44.
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program. Conceived as an "anti-poverty" program, today Medicaid is
a key pillar of the nation's health infrastructure, where access to
health insurance is often tantamount to access to any health care at
all. In a country where 20 percent of the population lacks any
insurance, many health institutions are vitally dependent on Medicaid
as a funding source for their services.ll Medicaid is jointly financed
by state and federal governments, with the federal share ranging from
50 to 83 percent, depending on the particular state's per capita
income relative to the national average.' 2 There are basic federal
rules and requirements under Medicaid law, but states have great
discretion as to the specific services that will be covered, what
population groups will be covered, and most of the operating details
of the program. Medicaid is an entitlement program, requiring states
to provide care to all who meet its terms of eligibility as a condition
for the receipt of federal funds. The operating language for this
entitlement, like other entitlement programs of the Social Security
Act, is the statute's requirement that such services must be furnished
with "reasonable promptness."
13
Medicaid funding is a crucial component to realizing the
deinstitutionalization objectives of the ADA, as interpreted by
Olmstead, because it provides the lion's share of the state's health
expenditures for individuals who have permanent disabilities (as
defined by the Social Security Act). Justice Ginsburg's plurality
opinion in Olmstead recognized that state health resources "are not
boundless."' 4 Under Olmstead, states have some latitude in how they
structure their health care infrastructure to meet the ADA's
requirements. Taking into account issues of cost, fairness, and the
overall health needs of their populations, states are permitted to defer
11. AUDRA WENZLOW, DAN FINKELSTEIN, BEN LE COOK, KATHY SHEPPERSON, CHRISTINE YIP &
DAVID BAUGH, THE MEDICAID ANALYTIC ExTRACT CHARTBOOK 13 (2007), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.govfMediaidDataSourcesGenlnfo/downloadslMAXChartbook_2007.pdf (finding
in 2002 that eighteen percent of the U.S. population was covered by Medicaid and that Medicaid
accounted for fifteen percent of health expenditures).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(8) (2006); see, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1981) (distinguishing a general federal grant program from an entitlement program such as the
former AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] program.).
14. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,603-07 (1999).
20101
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immediate access to community-based services. 15 Approximately 64
percent of individuals with disabilities that are severe enough to
prevent them from working rely on Medicaid for their health care.
16
The principal Medicaid program that finances community-based care
is the Medicaid home and community-based waiver program (the
"waiver program"). 17 However, not everyone who qualifies for these
services gets them, which is in part the result of the Makin decision,
its analysis, and other courts that have followed it.
Established in 1981, the waiver program authorizes individuals
qualifying for institutional care to receive, as an alternative, a
panoply of medical and personal services in their homes or other
residential settings in the community. Waiver services are generally
cheaper and more individually focused than services provided in
institutions or nursing facilities.18 The program represents a "waiver"
of the general federal requirement that federal Medicaid funds be
limited to services provided for "medical assistance," as defined in
the statute. 19 Congress recognized that such non-medical assistance
could be the key to avoiding more costly medical institutional care.
20
In what has been somewhat confusing, the legislation providing for
the waiver program also "waived" specific statutory provisions of the
Medicaid Act, a key part of the analysis below.
Typically, when states seek federal approval for a waiver program,
they set forth the maximum number of people who will be served at
15. This point was separately emphasized in J. Kennedy's concurrence. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 608
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, PERSONS WITH WORK DISABILITY BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS,
TABLE 541 (2005), http://www.census.gov (search "persons with work disability table 541"; then follow
hyperlink).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2006).
18. Charlene Harrington, Terrance Ng, H. Stephen Kaye & Robert J. Newcomer, Medicaid Home
and Community Based Services: Proposed Policies to Improve Access, Costs, and Quality, 19 PUB.
POL'Y & AGING REP. 13, 15 (2009) (finding waiver services expenditures were $44,000 per person
lower than Medicaid institutional spending in 2002).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) sets forth a number of services that are defined as "medical
assistance."
20. S. REP. No. 97-139, at 481 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 747-48. ("Certain
associated services are not eligible for federal matching payments. However, these services, while not
strictly medical in nature, may in fact contribute to improved health and could potentially postpone or
prevent institutionalization. To the extent that institutionalization is deferred or avoided, certain cost
savings may result.").
[Vol. 26:3
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any one time as part of the program, often called "slots." An
individual receiving a "slot" is assessed for services and based on the
assessment, is provided a specific set of services determined
necessary for him or her to reside safely in the community. 21 There
are generally two types of waivers. The more common waivers are
applicable to broader populations, such as the elderly, disabled and
those with developmental disabilities.22 It was the question of what
limits are applicable to these waiver programs that was the subject of
Makin. There are also "model waivers," that are often referred to as
demonstration programs, designed for individuals with specialized
diseases and conditions that are expensive to treat, such as those for
individuals who have severe brain and spinal cord injuries.23
Although Olmstead was decided under the 1991 ADA, 24 a general
consensus had been brewing for decades before in the health industry
and in the civil rights community disfavoring institutionalization as a
skewed treatment regime that subordinated the interests of patients.
25
Interestingly, the waiver program itself was passed by the new
Congress launched into office with the Reagan administration. It was
enacted as much as a cost-savings and efficiency reform as for any
other reason, as evident in the brief description of the program in the
Conference Report accompanying the legislation:
21. See Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021-22 (D. Haw. 1999).
22. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaiv
ProgDemoPGI/05_HCBSWaivers-Sectionl9l5(c).asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
23. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2002), remanded to No. 99-CV-558-SM, 2006
WL 2805238 (D.N.H. Sept. 29,2006).
24. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (2006)).
25. Judicial decisions reviewing the harms of institutionalization and questioning the authority of
states to institutionalize their residents under constitutional principles and federal statutory law span
several decades. The Olmstead decision may be seen as the latest incarnation in this now multi-decade
trend. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afjd sub nom, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1975);
Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem'l Ctr., No. 85-C-437, 1987 WL 27104 (N.D. Okla. July 24,
1987); Thomas v. Johnson, 557 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Tex. 1983); cf. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,
599-601 (1999); Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 528 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(citing U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' report describing a consensus disfavoring institutional care);
Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olnstead, and Positive Rights: A Preliminary
Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 269, 275-78 (2004).
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 807 2009-2010
2010) I E I G IN  II 807 
yo   t   r ,  l  lots."  
i l i i   t"  i s    
i  ific  i s i ed 
r   r     ?1  
 ll        
l  r ti s,    l   
  l ental     t 
  i le   r s  t f 
   l rs,"  rred  
tr tion ,  l  ialized 
 ti s  i   
ls  se ere brain and spinal cord injuries.23 
     24  
s     
 it   ti   
 t  t t subordinated the interests of patients.25 
i l , r      
      
    
    
 t ing  
. ii, 7,  . 
  . . s. l edicaidSt aiv 
I ai rs- ti I 15(c).asp  
.  ed  8-S ,  
 20  
,     
,  »  
   t  t rit   
  
l stead  
,  . . 
I, ); . . );  
f .  
 , .   
  O  . , {;  ); .  .  
'   
  unity-Based rvices, mst  itive  li inary 
iscussion,  . , . 
5
Schwalb: Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii:  The Right of Medicaid Beneficiari
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Committee Amendment - The bill permits the Secretary to waive
the current definition of covered medical services to include
certain nonmedical support services, other than room and board,
which are provided pursuant to a plan of care to an individual
otherwise at risk of being institutionalized and who would, in the
absence of such services, be institutionalized Such services
could include case management, supervised living, home
services, and nonmedical rehabilitation services approved by the
Secretary .... The committee expects that States which have
been granted a waiver will examine innovative and cost-efficient
means of rendering services to this population group.
26
The need and demand for community-based waiver programs was
apparent from its inception. By 1992, only eleven years later, there
were 153 waiver programs operating in 48 states.27 Today it is the
preferred mode of care for many individuals who previously would
have been left with the choice of institutionalization or going without
any care at all.
In the thirty years of the waiver's existence, there has been a role
reversal between states and the federal government as proponents of
the program's growth. At one time, the federal agency with
administrative authority over the program, the Health Care Financing
System [now, The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services
(CMS)] limited its growth through regulatory initiatives. 28 It is the
federal government that now seeks to encourage greater use of the
waiver program and deinstitutionalization, and generally it is the
states that have been reluctant to transform their health
infrastructure. 29 Having sealed the genie in the bottle in the first half
of the program's history, however, the federal government has found
it difficult to coax the genie back out.
26. H. R. REP. No. 97-208, at 481-82 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 747-48.
27. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-576, LONG TERM CARE: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF
GROWING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVERS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 11 (2003).
28. See infra notes 67-69.
29. See Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18, 2001). A list of current Olmstead-
related lawsuits kept by the National Association of State Developmental Disabilities Services can be
found at http://www.nasddds.org/LitigationUpdates/index.shtml.
[Vol. 26:3
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The key case authorizing states to limit growth and availability of
community based services was Makin v. Hawaii, the first case to
address directly and decisively how, and whether, the waiver
programs must follow Medicaid's general requirement that services
be provided to beneficiaries with "reasonable promptness." Makin
arose from a class action brought on behalf of individuals with
developmental disabilities seeking Medicaid services from the state
through its waiver program for individuals with developmental
disabilities. The state had a waiting list of 801 individuals two
months before the court's ruling, without any guidance as to when the
services were to be provided. 30 The plaintiffs argued that the waiting
list violated Medicaid's "reasonable promptness" requirement, but
the court rejected this theory.31
The court's opinion in Makin has cast a shadow on access to
community-based services, and under its persuasive authority,
waiting lists for individuals with developmental disabilities and
mental retardation have proliferated in most states. 32 A recent study
found waiting lists in thirty-one states and that-across the country-
some 73,000 individuals were on waiting lists for waiver services,
representing fully one-third to one-half of those receiving services.33
Generally, these states provide no time-limits for how long
individuals must wait for services to be provided, and it is not
uncommon for beneficiaries to wait for years without getting
services, if they get services at all. As noted above, a large number of
disabled individuals are dependent on waiver programs as their
principal means of care. 34 Their right to non-institutional care has
effectively been tethered to the holding of Makin, and subsequent
cases that have followed its analysis. It is not just the
developmentally disabled that are affected. Today, more people with
physical disabilities, individuals with spinal cord injuries, and the
30. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023 (D. Haw. 1999).
31. Id. at 1030-31.
32. See Harrington et al., supra note 18.
33. See TARREN BRAGDON, UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY (UCP), THE CASE FOR INCLUSION 2007: AN
ANALYSIS OF MEDICAID FOR AMERICANS WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 16
(2007), http://www.ucp.org/medicaid/fullreport.cfin. Notably, ten states did not respond to the survey.
34. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 16.
2010]
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frail elderly are often served in waiver programs at home for their
care than in hospitals or nursing facilities. 35 Waiting lists have grown
significantly in many states where individuals currently residing in
institutions could safely return to homes and communities. Ten years
after they were challenged in Makin, the practices of states
maintaining indefinite wait lists is a common occurrence with
Medicaid programs throughout the United States. This article
analyzes that decision, and questions the court's analysis and legal
conclusions.
B. The Current State of the Law with Respect to Population Limits
on Waiver Programs
At issue in Makin was Medicaid's core entitlement mandating that
services to beneficiaries be provided with "reasonable promptness."
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) provides that "[a] state plan for
medical assistance must-(8) provide ... that such assistance shall be




The plaintiffs in Makin alleged that the State was violating
Medicaid's reasonable promptness provision by maintaining a
waiting list for services and not assuring that the services would
actually be provided.37 The State argued that the waiting list was not
impermissible because federal law authorized "population limits" in
waiver programs. 38 The court essentially agreed with this analysis:
The statute and regulations provide for limits on HCBS-MR
services [home and community-based waiver services for the
mentally retarded] and further provide they are not to be
considered "available" under the statute when the slots are filled.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C),(c)(9), (c)(10); 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.303(6). Therefore under the statute, the State need not
35. See, e.g., MARY JO GIBSON, STEVEN R. GREGORY, ARi N. HOUSER & WENDY Fox-GEORGE,
AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., ACROSS THE STATES: PROFILES OF LONG TERM CARE (2004).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2006).
37. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1025 (D. Haw. 1999).
38. Id. at 1026.
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provide services to new "eligible" individuals until slots become
available.39
In supporting its analysis, the court referenced two instances in
which the Medicaid statute explicitly mentioned limits. It found these
provisions ambiguous, however, and it looked to the regulations to
resolve the ambiguity:
Initially, section 1396n(c)(9) provides that if the State program
"contains a limit on the number of individuals who shall receive"
HCBS-MR services," the State may substitute additional
individuals to receive" the services to replace people who died or
became ineligible for them Second, section 1396n(c)(10)
contains a limitation on the Secretary regarding the limits that he
or she may allow a State to place on the programs. It sets a
minimum number of individuals in a HCBS-MR program at 200
people. It is also important to note that there is no language in the
statute providing for these "limits" on the ICF/MRs [institutional
services], suggesting that there is reason to treat the programs
differently. Thus, Congress has provided states with the authority
to set limits on the amount of slots available in an HCBS-MR
program, and at the very least, the statute is ambiguous
concerning whether "limits" are allowed.
Fortunately, the agency regulations clear up any ambiguity or
doubt that the statute may have created. In 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.303(6), the HCFA [Health Care Finance Administration]
states that the State must provide the number of individuals that
it intends to grant HCBS-MR services to in each of the years
covered by the waiver application. Then, it states that "this
number will constitute a limit on the size of the waiver program"
unless the State requests a greater number and the Secretary
approves it. Once the Secretary of HCFA [HHS] approves the
number, it becomes the "population limit" on the HCBS-MR
services. The court must defer to agency's regulations since it
39. Id. at 1027.
20l1
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 811 2009-2010
10) I ERI G IN AII 
 i es t   li ible" ls  
il l .39 
811 
     
 i i  t t  i itl  i    
 i s,    
  
(c)(9)    
"contains a limit on the nu ber of individuals  ll i " 
 s,"  
l  i "  
 i l  e  ,  
i   t r  i   
 .  
      
    




,     ,     
   
 
ted  




tit te  it  " 
 
   
, it  t  l ti  li it   t   
.      '     
. t  
9
Schwalb: Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii:  The Right of Medicaid Beneficiari
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
does not contradict the intent or purpose of the statute. Thus, it is
clear that the Medicaid statute and its regulations require the
State to provide a number to the Secretary that will act as the
limit on the State's HCBS-MR program every year. As a result,
when the slots are filled by eligible individuals, the HCBS-MR
program is no longer a "feasible alternative" available under the
waiver. Stated differently, the HCBS-MR program is not an
entitlement.4°
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon regulation 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.303 to determine that states were authorized to have
"population limits." Once these "population limits" were deemed
proper, the Court effectively read the Medicaid statute to have made
an implicit exception to its reasonable promptness provision
permitting states to keep additional Medicaid beneficiaries
indefinitely unserved on waiting lists.4 1 Several subsequent decisions,
including federal appellate court decisions, have reached the same
conclusion, finding that the reasonable promptness provision does not
require states to eliminate waiting lists for community services.42
Some cases find the "reasonable promptness" requirement applicable
only to any authorized, but unfilled slots below the "population
limit," but without any legal obligation to increase these limits to
meet the demands of those on the waiting list.43 A few mostly pre-
Makin district court cases suggest that the reasonable promptness
requirement does apply to waiting lists. However, these cases do not
40. Id at 1027-28 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 1028.
42. Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005); Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d
452 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that llinois's adoption of "priority population criteria" complies with
reasonable promptness criteria.); cf Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2002) (analyzing a
"model waiver" program, with separate requirements than the regular waiver programs); see also Brown
v. Tenn. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 561 F.3d 542, 548 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an anticipated
argument by class Plaintiffs of the obligation to serve all eligible recipients in the state's waiver
program); Masterman v. Goodno, No. 03-2939, 2004 WL 51271, at *9 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004)
(asserting without analysis that Congress has allowed states to limit the number of people to be served
under waiver).
43. Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 77-79 (D. Mass. 2000); Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health,
275 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1343 (D.N.M. 2003); see M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (D. Utah
2003).
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fully analyze the issue because of their procedural context.44 In Arc of
Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock,45 the Ninth Circuit followed
essentially the same reasoning of Makin v. Hawaii with a more
truncated analysis. 46  Thus, the Makin decision and its analysis
represent the current state of the law.47
The consistency of Braddock and other post-Makin cases is
somewhat surprising. After all, while the Medicaid statute is
notoriously complex, the plain language of the statute does not
actually exclude the waiver program from the "reasonable
promptness" provision. The exception to the reasonable promptness
requirement was created by the Makin court's interpretation of a
regulation, not statutory provisions which it found "ambiguous.
'A8
Yet, this raises the question: what authority was there for the
agency's promulgation of 42 C.F.R. § 441.303 so as to create the
exception to the statute's "reasonable promptness" provision?
44. Michele P. v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769-70 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (denying motion to
dismiss reasonable promptness claim); McMillan v. McCrimmon, 807 F. Supp. 475, 481 (C.D. I11. 1992)
(applying "reasonable promptness," but not referencing a population cap); Benjamin H. v. Ohl, No.
3:99-0338, 1999 WL 34783552, at *13 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 1999) (finding the plaintiffs "likely to
succeed" on reasonable promptness claim seeking preliminary injunction).
45. Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005).
46. The court reasoned:
As an alternative to institutionalized care for the disabled, the Medicaid statute and
regulations allow states to apply for waiver programs for home and community-based
care. However, Congress envisioned such programs as limited in scope, and therefore
included the following language in 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c), the waiver portion of the
statute: (9) In the case of any waiver under this subsection which contains a limit on the
number of individuals who shall receive home or community based services, the State
may substitute additional individuals to receive such services to replace any individuals
who die or become ineligible for services under the State plan. (10) The Secretary shall
not limit to fewer than 200 the number of individuals in the State who may receive home
and community-based services under a waiver under the subsection. The regulations
implementing the statute go farther, requiring states to place a limit on the number of
waiver program participants, and requiring states to adhere to the limitation ....
Braddock, 427 F.3d at 613.
47. See also Kubo, supra note 3, at 755-56 (summarizing then current cases).
48. See Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1027-28 (D. Haw. 1999).
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II. THE LEVEL OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE THAT SHOULD BE ACCORDED
THE REGULATION THAT MAKIN HELD AUTHORIZED POPULATION
LIMITS AND ITS REGULATORY HISTORY
A. The Standard of Review for Administrative Agency Regulations
The seminal case on executive agency rule-making, Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, generally requires
courts to defer to executive agencies' interpretive regulations within
their statutorily delegated authority when confronted with legal
questions not addressed in a statute.49 Chevron requires courts to
sustain such interpretations if they are within the range of reasonable
interpretations.5 ° However, this is a general rule, and not all agency
interpretations are entitled to deference. 51 The Makin court's analysis
overlooked an important part of the question by presuming deference
to CMS's regulation 42 C.F.R. § 441.303 without first inquiring into
its regulatory history and fully analyzing the level of deference to
which the regulation was entitled.52 Had it done so, that court may
have reached a different conclusion.
The first step in the review of agency regulations "is whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the Court
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." 53 Where the question is not addressed
in the statute, the next step is to determine if Congress made a
delegation of authority for the agency to fill gaps in the statute. If
Congress made such a delegation, "[s]uch legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute., 54 Such deference under Chevron,
however, is warranted only "when it appears that Congress delegated
49. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
50. Id. at 843-44.
51. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006).
52. Makin, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 ("The Court must defer to the regulation because it does not
contradict the intent and purpose of the statute."). This assertion is challenged throughout this article.
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
54. Id. at 844.
[Vol. 26:3
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authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Otherwise the
interpretation is entitled to respect only to the extent it has the power
to persuade." 5
5
In order for such regulations to have the "force and effect of law"
it is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and some
56delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress.
Congressional delegations of authority to regulate need not always
be explicitly expressed for judicial deference to be applied. If there is
no expressed delegation, an "interpretive gap" in the statute, along
with a delegation of policy-making authority, can still warrant
administrative deference to a regulation as an implied delegation.
57
Where the statute is silent on a question and Congress has delegated
to an agency the authority to promulgate regulations, Chevron
requires that the agency's rule be upheld so long as it is a reasonable
construction of the statute. It need not be the construction most
persuasive to a court. Chevron and its progeny recognize that an
agency's specialized experience in a particular area places such
executive agencies in a better position to determine Congressional
intent, and the policies most consistent with that intent.
58
When there is no delegation, the regulation has only such
persuasive authority as it derives from the circumstance surrounding
its promulgation. "[T]he level of deference will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control., 59 An additional factor warranting deference is the degree the
subject matter "necessarily requires significant expertise and entails
55. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
56. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979).
57. Pauley v. Beth Energy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
58. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
59. EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (citing Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-
46 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))); accord Heimermann v. First
Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1261 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
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the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns." 60 Finally,
even after deference and respect are accorded, the agency's
interpretation must still be at least a reasonable one.
61
B. Did Congress Delegate to the Agency Authority to Set Limits on
the Waiver Program?
With this standard in mind, what level of deference should be
accorded CMS's regulation 42 C.F.R. § 441.303, which the Makin
court held authorized states to establish strict population limits and,
consequentially, waiting lists? This interpretation of the regulation,
the court then viewed as authorizing the state to avoid Medicaid
statute's "reasonable promptness" requirement. Is rule 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.303 entitled to Chevron deference, effectively foreclosing
judicial authority to question it?
The first problem in bestowing Chevron deference is that there
does not appear to be a specific statutory delegation to CMS to
promulgate regulations in the waiver. The statute provides the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, which
oversees CMS, with authority to approve waivers (subject to a range
of assurances provided by the state), but does not specifically provide
for rule-making authority. Under United States v. Mead,62 Chevron
deference does not apply unless Congress intended to delegate such
authorization to the agency. "Chevron deference ... is not accorded
merely because the statute is ambiguous and an administrative
official is involved.. . . [T]he rule must be promulgated pursuant to
authority Congress has delegated to the official., 63 Not only does the
statute not explicitly delegate to CMS the authority to promulgate
60. Pauley, 501 U.S. at 697 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991)); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln People's Util. Dist., 67 U.S. 380, 390
(1984); accord Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989).
61. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 591 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2000).
63. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27); cf Pub. L. No.
97-248, § 122(g)(2), 96 Stat. 324, 363 (1982) ("[T]he Secretary of [HHS] shall, not later than September
1, 1983, promulgate such final regulations as may be necessary to set forth-(A) a description of the
care included in 'hospice care' and the standards for qualifications of a 'hospice program'....").
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rules under the waiver, in several instances it actually restricts the
Secretary from denying waivers to states.
64
Although in 1935 Congress provided a general delegation of rule
making authority in the Social Security Act (of which Medicaid is a
part) to the Secretaries of Health, Education and Welfare,65 Labor,
and Treasury, not inconsistent with the Act, 66 there are several
reasons to question this delegation as sufficient to bestow Chevron
deference to CMS's waiver regulations. First, Medicaid did not exist
at the time of this delegation, and it was in fact forty years before
Chevron itself, when executive authority for rule-making was more
circumscribed. Consistent with this period, the delegation is limited
in scope to make rules "necessary for the efficient administration of
the functions with which each is charged under this chapter."
67
"Efficient administration" appears more restrictive a delegation than
other more expansive legislative delegations. By contrast, other
statutes have explicitly invited agencies to exercise their discretion in
shaping a program, such as by authorizing regulations which in the
agency's "judgment" best "effectuate the purposes" of the statute;68
or to make rules "necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of the Act."69 Moreover, since the waiver program's
provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 1396n waive other parts of the statute, any
delegation ought to be strictly construed to avoid becoming an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
70
C. The Agency's Rationale for the Waiver Regulation and Its History
Even without an explicit legislative delegation, the regulation may
still be entitled to deference on the basis of an implied grant of
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(6), (c)(10) (2006).
65. The predecessor agency to the United States Department of Health and Human Services.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 259 (citing Household Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pfenning, 541 U.S. 232, 238
(2004)).
69. Id. at 258 (citing National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005)).
70. Cf Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 471 (2001) (discussing limits on
Congress's power to delegate to agencies).
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 817 2009-2010
) I  I  II 817 
 tricts  
 fr  denying waivers to states.64 
 l    
t   i   
   ,65  
t t t,66  
t  
  '   .  
,  
 lf, i  i   
scribed t  t  
 i istration  
it  ic  each is charged under this chapter.,,67 
i i t i i t ti     i   
 i    
  
  
's j t  best "effectuate the purposes" of the statute;68 
   
  t.,,69 's 
 .c    
ti     
tit ti al delegation of legislative power.70 
. '  l    i tory 
 i    
 f 
. iO  
.  r r  t  t  it  t t  t t  lt    i . )  
[ .  
. l ,  . . t  iti  l  it ., . . ,  . . ,  ». 
. !d. at  ( iti  ti l l   l . ss'  . r   I t r t r .,  . . , 
 ». 
. f it  . .  ' ,  . . ,   
'  
15
Schwalb: Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii:  The Right of Medicaid Beneficiari
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
authority. Failing that, the regulation may still be determined to be
persuasive, even if not entitled to Chevron deference. An agency's
interpretation of a statute, reflected in a rule, may have such
persuasive authority so as to be enforceable even without a
delegation.7'
Whether regulation 42 C.F.R. § 441.303 was the result of an
implied delegated authority, or alternatively, in the absence of
delegated authority, is supported by a nonetheless highly persuasive
agency rationale, is a question best resolved by considering the
agency's own reasoning in adopting "population limits."7 2 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.303 was promulgated on July 25, 1994 through a formal
comment and rule making procedure.73 These 1994 regulations made
changes to an earlier version of the regulation, issued on June 1,
1988.74 How did CMS explain the basis for the population limits in
its regulations? Unfortunately, the only references to the provision on
population caps are rather oblique. In response to one comment, CMS
explained its reason for limiting the number served in the waiver to
those set out in the waiver application:
Section 1915(c)(2)(D) of the Act requires that we assess the
reasonableness of a State's estimate of the cost-neutrality of its
program. If a State anticipates substantive changes in its cost and
utilization estimates, we believe that the State should be required
to submit amendments to explain the basis and extent of the
changes the State's recomputed cost-effectiveness formula,
based on the revised cost and utilization, must substantiate
continued cost-neutrality.75
71. EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (citing Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-42 (1976)); accord Heimmermann v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11 th Cir.
2002).
72. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies are required to provide a general statement of
a proposed regulation's basis and purpose when promulgated. See Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor,
Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 297-98 (2d Cir. 2006).
73. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702 (Sept. 25, 1994).
74. 53 Fed. Reg. 19,959 (June 1, 1988).
75. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702, 37,708 (Sept. 25, 1994).
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In another section, CMS also elaborated on its requirement that
states report the number of people to be served in the waiver
program:
Even though we have eliminated the "C" value (number of
unduplicated waiver individuals a State intends to serve for each
year of the waiver) from the equation, we will continue to require
each state to report this information to us as part of a waiver
request. This number may be revised when a State determines
that it needs to increase or decrease the number of individuals it
estimates it would serve under the waiver. We will include this
number in our approval notices.76
What is especially notable is the absence of any assertion by CMS
of a clear statutory basis for imposing population limits on waiver
programs. In promulgating this regulation, CMS cited no statutory
provision. It pointed to no "interpretive gap." It referenced no
legislative history. It divined no evidence of Congressional intent.
This may be considered telling and convincing evidence that such
limits are not based on the statute. In the absence of a statutory basis
for the rule, its own authority to have set "population limits" is
questionable. "[T]he mere promulgation of a regulation, without a
concomitant exegesis of the statutory authority for doing so,
obviously lacks the 'power to persuade' as to the existence of such
authority."
77
Moreover, CMS uses the term "cost and utilization estimates" in
the first paragraph, and the term "estimates" is repeated in the second
paragraph. It does not use the terms population "limits" or "caps."
These estimates appear to be solely determined by states. The only
limitations to the general waiver program expressed in the comments
are in reference to demonstrating "cost neutrality," an issue that
Congress did reference pervasively in the statute. 78 It seems evident
76. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702, 37,708-09 (Sept. 25, 1994).
77. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 661 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978)).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D), (4)(A) (2006).
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by the use of the term "estimates" that the language in the regulation
was not designed to further a Congressional intent to limit the waiver
population. Rather, these "population limits" merely appear to have
been a means to demonstrate the waiver's cost-neutrality.
Further support that the regulation's limiting language was
intended to be merely a procedure to demonstrate cost neutrality
rather than to place a limit on population growth may be gleaned
from the section heading of 42 C.F.R. § 441.303: "Supportive
Documents Required." That the population limits were merely a
procedural requirement needed to demonstrate the program's "cost
neutrality" is supported by other narrative provided in the comments
to the regulations. The 1985 comments to the predecessor regulation
42 C.F.R. § 441.303 similarly focused on "estimates" and
demonstrating cost neutrality:
Section 441.303(f)(4) . .. requires States to specify the number
of waiver clients actually being deinstitutionalized from certified
facilities versus those diverted from admission .... States must
also specify where the diverted individuals will be coming from
and how many will come from each location.... These changes
are a result of our experience dealing with waiver requests and
are needed to determine whether the State's estimates are
reasonable.79
In reviewing the regulatory history of the waiver program, it is
worth considering CMS's history of making overly restrictive
regulations. CMS itself recognized this history of preventing states
from taking full advantage of the waiver program and contravening
Congressional intent. The most vivid example of this is what was at
one time referred to as the "cold bed test," in which CMS required
states to demonstrate that they had actual empty institutional slots or
"beds" to match each waiver slot the state sought to provide:
79. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,013, 10,018 (Mar. 13, 1985).
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We believe that the requirement that States establish that there
would be sufficient institutional bed capacity for their waiver
population in the event that there was no waiver should be
rescinded. While this requirement served a sound analytical
purpose as part of the cost-neutrality test in the early days of the
program, our experience over the last several years has shown it
to be of diminishing value. The requirement placed an
unreasonable burden on States by requiring them to project the
estimated development of additional institutional capacity. That
additional burden was never the requirement's intent and its
development was contrary to the interests of the States and the
Federal Government. 80
CMS also put a limitation on respite services, a type of service
provided in waiver programs, without statutory authority for such
limits, which Congress then eliminated in 1990 legislation.
81
In summary, the 1994 promulgation of the home and community-
based waiver program regulation, while consistent with CMS's
history of overly-restrictive waiver provisions, does not evidence a
belief that Congress intended states to have federally-imposed
population caps in their standard waiver programs. Rather, it appears
that the regulations demonstrate CMS's focus on cost neutrality, or
the demonstration thereof, as its purpose in adopting the regulation,
an issue for which there is abundant evidence of Congressional
intent.
If the "caps" did not come from the 1994 language, did they come
from the prior language? The 1985 regulation sets out a lengthy and
complex formula for data that states must provide CMS in their
waiver application. 82 However, the regulation makes no reference to
"caps" or population limitations. 83 Rather than "limits" or "caps," the
80. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702, 37,712 (Sept. 25, 1994).
81. Id. at 37,704.
82. The actual regulation as it existed prior to the 1994 change is included in Appendix I to this
article.
83. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,026-27 (Mar. 13, 1985).
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term used in the regulation is "estimates." This term is used explicitly
in reference to cost effectiveness.
84
When one reviews CMS's regulatory history for a rationale
authorizing strict limits on the number of participants for the
"thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . "85 one finds
very little evidence to support such limitations. It is evident from the
above regulatory history that it was the test of cost neutrality that
CMS was most concerned about, not population limits per se.86 In
contrast to a provision of specific limits of participants in the waiver
program, the evidence of Congressional intent to limit waiver
programs on the basis of cost-neutrality is explicit in the language of
the legislation, and manifested in its legislative history and CMS's
regulatory history. 87
Thus, the Makin court's view that the regulations evidenced a
statutory intent for the waiver program to have fixed limits, and that
such limits carved out an exception to the "reasonable promptness"
provision, is not a position supported by CMS in its regulatory
history. In the waiver's regulatory history, CMS makes no pretense to
speak for Congressional intent to establish mandatory limitations on
the waiver program (with the exception of the model waiver
program). 88 Rather, the regulatory history appears to support a waiver
program that sets forth "estimates" of the number of beneficiaries, or
at best, a "soft" cap on the number of participants: amendable,
flexible, and limited only to the extent that they continue to meet the
cost-effectiveness standard set out by Congress. The "limits" cited in
the simplified version of 42 C.F.R. § 441.303 were merely an easy
and convenient way for CMS to have states demonstrate cost
neutrality. To the extent that the Makin court saw these limits as
84. See also 53 Fed. Reg. 19,959, 19,962 (June 1, 1988).
85. EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,257 (1991) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)).
86. See supra notes 59 and 60.
87. H. R. REP. No. 97-208, at 481-82 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 747-48.
88. See infra note 158.
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Congressionally authorized, fixed and firm enough implicitly to
avoid the "reasonable promptness" obligation, regulation 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.303 does not appear to have been drafted with the intention to
support such an interpretation.
III. SUPPORT IN THE STATUTE FOR FINDING A "REASONABLE
PROMPTNESS" OBLIGATION
A. Statutory Support for Inclusion of the "Reasonable Promptness"
Requirement
If regulation 42 C.F.R. § 441.303 cited by Makin, Braddock,
Bryson and subsequent courts does not evidence a Congressional
intent to impose numerical limitations on state waiver programs, how
does the statute address the question of whether the "reasonable
promptness" provision applies to waiver programs? The most
compelling interpretation is also the most obvious interpretation. The
"cardinal rule of statutory construction"--giving effect to the plain
meaning of a statute-supports this inclusion:
[A] court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before
all others. We have stated time and time again that courts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there .... When the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last:
"judicial inquiry is complete." 89
Although the Medicaid statute is notoriously complicated, stripped
away, the plain language of the statute does not exempt the waiver
from the "reasonable promptness" provision. Specifically, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n(c)(1) includes home and community-based services as
within the definition of "medical assistance." 9° 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(8)
requires "such assistance be provided with reasonable promptness."
91
89. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (2006).
91. Id. § 1396a(8).
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The apparent presumption in Makin and other courts that
Congress's failure to waive the "reasonable promptness" was an
oversight is not supported from a review of the statute's context and
legislative history. The language in the statute demonstrates that
Congress was not unfamiliar with the requirements of the Medicaid
statute and was specific about which provisions of the Act that it
wanted waived. As set forth below, the "reasonable promptness"
provision was not included among these:
A waiver granted under this subsection may include a waiver of
the requirements of section 1396a(a)(1) of this title (relating to
statewideness), section 1396a(10)(B) of this title (relating to
comparability), and section 1396a(10)(C)(i)(1)(II) of this title
(relating to income and resource rules applicable in the
community.
92
Under the maxim of statutory construction, expression unius est
exclusion alterius, Congress's exclusion of the "reasonable
promptness" provision from the list of statutory requirements that it
authorized a state to waive in its waiver program should be viewed as
an intention that it not be waived.93 Further supporting the
proposition that the statute's plain language was deliberate and
reflective of Congressional intent is the fact that the waiver of one of
the provisions listed above, the exclusion of income and resource
provisions, was not in the original 1981 language of the waiver
program. It was added in 1986. 94 By failing to also add an exemption
for "reasonable promptness" when Congress added the income and
resource exemption, a presumption arises that Congress did not view
the failure to exempt reasonable promptness requirements in 1981 to
be an "oversight." When Congress amends a section of the statute but
92. Id. § 1396n(c)(3).
93. Cf Russelo v. United States, 446 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("Where Congress includes particular
language in one section but omits it an -another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion and exclusion." (quoting United
States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
94. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 941 1(c), 100 Stat. 1874
(1986).
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leaves other language unchanged, it suggests that the original
language was reflective of its true intent.
95
In the face of such relatively clear provisions in the statute, there is
a heavy burden that must be overcome to demonstrate that Congress
did not in fact mean the words it used in the statute it enacted.
"'[R]epeals by implication are not favored' and will not be presumed
unless the 'intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and
manifest.' 96 When other provisions of the statute are considered,
particularly with respect to how the program is intended to operate,
there is additional support for finding that Congress envisioned the
reasonable promptness provision to apply to the waiver program.
B. Support for the Inclusion of the Reasonable Promptness
Obligation from Other Requirements Set Forth in the Waiver Statute
Looking beyond the explicit inclusion of the "reasonable
promptness" obligation in the language of the statute, other
provisions provide additional contextual support for its inclusion. "It
is a 'fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme.' ' 97 In particular, the waiver statute
contains expansive notice provisions to inform large numbers of
potential beneficiaries of the program, and the program's provision
for providing beneficiaries with alternatives to non-institutional
placement suggest that Congress did not have an intent for fixed and
inflexible population limits. On the other hand, excluding the
reasonable promptness provision provokes substantial conflict with
these provisions, suggesting that this was never intended.
As suggested in the portion of the statute reproduced below, it is
apparent that Congress wanted notice of the waiver program to reach
the broadest range of potential recipients. The statute sets forth as a
condition of approval to operate a waiver program that notice to
95. See Eidmann v. MSPB, 976 F.2d 1400, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
96. Nat'l Assoc. of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007) (citations
omitted).
97. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citing Davis v. Mich.
Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
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potential beneficiaries be provided, and for their choice of
community services to be effectuated. 98 This provision is often
referred to as the "freedom of choice" provision:
A waiver shall not be granted under this subsection unless the
State provides assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that - (C)
such individuals who are determined to be likely to require the
level of care provided in a hospital, nursing facility, or
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded are informed
of the feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver, at the
choice of such individuals, to the provision of inpatient hospital
services, nursing facility services, or services in an intermediate
care facility for the mentally retarded .... 99
This "freedom of choice" provision was raised by the Plaintiffs in
Makin as a separate legal basis to challenge the state's waiting list.
The Plaintiffs argued that by maintaining an indefinite wait list, the
state's waiver program was denying beneficiaries their choice as
provided in the statutory language cited above.' 00 The Makin court
rejected this claim, but its analysis of the issue may be criticized for
borrowing heavily from its earlier legal conclusion:
Though this requires the State to give the Plaintiffs a choice from
among the services, it only requires it to allow a choice from
among the "available" services. Unfortunately, when the spaces
are filled in the HCBS-MR program, it is no longer "available"
under the waiver. This remains the case regardless of whether
there is a wait list for the services. Since no regulation or other
law provides a different result regarding the "population limits"
of the HCBS-MR programs and the Plaintiffs are not claiming
that they have no other alternatives under the waiver program,
98. See infra note 115.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(cX2)(C) (2006).
100. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (D. Haw. 1999).
[Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 826 2009-2010
826  TE I ERSITY  I  l.  
   i ,   ir  f 
ity  e t ated.  i  i  i   
r     do   i e"  
 i r r   
  s t r  t r  ) 
i ls t i e   
f i   it l,  
i t   t ll  r e  
 ti s,    
 i i   
, ,   
. 9 
edo   i e"       
 t  l   's ti  . 
 f    i i  i ite   
'  r ra   i  i iaries  
   e.100  i   
    i   
 l    
 
,  




   
 
 
.  liS  
. .s.  )( )(C)  
. .  ,  . . . 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 10
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/10
RECONSIDERING MAKIN V HA WAIl
the Plaintiffs have no valid "freedom of choice" cause of action
under the Medicaid statute in this case.'01
Thus, in the court's view the "freedom of choice" provision, as
well as the notice provision, is subject to slots being "available":
Medicaid beneficiaries are notified of community-based services only
when the slots are "available" under the waiver. 10 2 This interpretation
appears to presume a Congressional intent that beneficiaries should
be notified of their rights under the program only when there are
tangible alternatives readily available to them. An alternative reading
of the provision is that it is designed for the state to develop its
community-based resources to bring about beneficiaries' choice of
community based resources. Consumers are advised of the services
that are provided (generally available) under the waiver, whether or
not immediately accessible.
Reading "available" to mean "open slots available," however,
appears to ignore the word "feasible" in the state's obligation to
inform individuals of "feasible alternatives" under the waiver. 103 "[IUt
is axiomatic that 'all words and provisions of statutes are intended to
have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should
be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases
meaningless, redundant or superfluous."' 0 4 "Feasible" generally
means "capable of being successfully done or accomplished."' 0 5 The
Makin court's interpretation appears to render this word as
surplusage. The court's interpretation appears to equate the word
"alternatives" to "available slots" in the waiver program. But
Congress's use of the word "feasible" in the statutory language,
"feasible alternatives," suggests that Congress intended to advise and
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (2006).
104. United States v. Caraballo, 200 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Menasche,
348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 739 (4th ed. 1957); accord Am. Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981) (noting the statute's use of the term "feasible" referred to the technical capability
and precluded OSHA from adding economic considerations in its issuance of its cotton dust remediation
rule).
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enable consumers to choose services technically possible to be
provided them under the waiver, even if not presently "available."
This language suggests that as long as the services in the waiver
represent "feasible alternatives" to institutionalization, Congress
wanted consumers aware of these alternative services, and to be
given the choice of receiving them.1
0 6
The statute's broad notice provision appears to conflict with the
court's construction permitting states to restrict the availability of
slots. Because the "freedom of choice" provision is triggered when
someone is "likely" to meet the level of care, 107 not when he or she
meets the level of care, it applies even before individuals definitively
qualify for waiver services. Such a broad notice requirement appears
inconsistent with a construction that limits notice only when there are
"available" slots. If the goal is to advise beneficiaries of only real,
tangible, "available slots" as the Makin court's interpretation seems
to favor,108 the statutory language would have been better served by
advising consumers of alternatives only after they definitively
qualified for services. In contrast, if "feasible alternatives" means
services generally able to be provided under the waiver, notifying
beneficiaries early, even before they definitively qualify, would
apprise the state of the need to meet the projected growth in the
program.
One can appreciate why the court would want to find the statute's
reference to "alternatives" to mean "available slots." At first blush,
this interpretation appears to permit the court to escape an underlying
tension created after it determined that the waiver program is not
bound to the reasonable promptness obligation. If "available under
the waiver" means "generally available" under the waiver, the state's
compliance with the notice requirement would require it, confusingly,
to inform potential beneficiaries of services under the waiver and
their "right" to choice. However, in light of its earlier holding
authorizing strict limits on the program, this would be appear to be a
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(3) (2006).
107. Id. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
108. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (D. Haw. 1999).
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senseless act, because the state would not actually have to provide the
services or effectuate their choice. By finding that "available under
the waiver" means "open slots," the court appears initially to have
avoided this exercise in futility. However, rather than resolve this
problem, this interpretation really only heightens it.
Because most waiver programs have populations in the thousands,
there will inevitably be at least a few "available" slots under the
waiver, as beneficiaries die, become too ill to stay on the waiver, or
will, for a host of other reasons, become ineligible or unable to
benefit from the program. Thus, even when a program appears to be
generally full, there essentially will still be a few "available" slots.,
°9
Thus, even under the court's reading limiting the notice requirement
to "open slots," the presence of a few slots still means that everyone
"likely" to qualify for the services will still have to get notice. They
will have to get the notice even though, without the reasonable
promptness obligation, only a minute fraction may actually be able to
access the services, and the state will not have any obligation to serve
the other applicants.
This, in turn, leads to another equally daunting problem: how are
the few slots "available" to be allocated? Are they to be provided on
a "first come first served" basis; or based on urgency of medical
need; cost or cost savings; or some combination of these? There is no
provision in the statute resolving this question of prioritization, and
the Makin court did not address this issue.110 The presence of such
vexing complications should be an additional basis to view the
court's interpretation as disfavored. "Congress... does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes."l 1
109. In the Makin decision the court itself noted in two instances that there were "a few remaining
unfilled slots available" but left this issue as an outstanding unresolved issue of material fact. Id. at 1031
n.6. The same problem has been cited in other cases such as Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 275 F.
Supp. 2d 1319, 1334-35 (D.N.M. 2003).
110. Makin, 114F.Supp.2datO31n.6.
11l. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citations omitted).
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These complications arise from the court's interpretation excluding
the reasonable promptness language in the statute, and are all easily
avoided with its inclusion. The broad notice of potential beneficiaries
does not become a wasteful exercise in futility for the large number
of individuals unable to have their choice effectuated by a state
unwilling to expand its program. Rather, it informs the state of the
projected needs for the program, and obligates the state to adjust its
ratio of institutional versus community services in its Medicaid
program to fit beneficiaries' desires. The substantial problem of
having to find practical and legally supported methods to ration the
services does not arise when the statute's plain language is given
effect
In the regulatory history of the waiver, CMS's interpretation of the
"freedom of choice" provision, while not directly addressing these
points, arguably provides some inconsistencies with the Makin
court's interpretation subjecting the "freedom of choice" provision to
"available slots." The agency explained:
Beneficiaries determined likely to require an SNF or ICF level of
care must be informed of the feasible alternatives and given a
choice as to which type of services to receive . . . . The
determination of which long-term care options are feasible in a
particular case should be based on the individual's needs, as
determined by an evaluation. As with other services under
Medicaid, a beneficiary who is not given the choice of home or
community-based services as an alternative to SNF or ICF
services may request a fair hearing under 42 C.F.R. Part 431,
Subpart E, unless the reason for the denial is that the group of
which the individual is a part is not included within the scope of
the waiver (see 42 C.F.R. 431.220(b)). Since a finding that home
or community-based services are not feasible in a particular case
constitutes denial of services covered under the State's Medicaid
plan, the Medicaid statute (section 1902(a)(3)) requires that
applicants and beneficiaries be provided the procedural
[Vol. 26:3
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protections of the Medicaid administrative hearing process as
described in 42 CFR part 431, Subpart E."
2
This language tends to support application of the reasonable
promptness requirement to the waiver. It reflects the broad notice and
hearing requirement for anyone denied his or her choice of home and
community-based services, exempting only those seeking services
not included in the scope of waiver program."l 3 Second, the basis of
denial of service embraced in this explanation focuses not on
resources, but whether or not services are "feasible in a particular
case." 1 4 The emphasis on individual determinations, without
reference to "quotas," "caps," or "resource limitations," suggests that
these are not proper justifications for denying individual choice. 115
Most compelling, however, is that it does not reference as a basis for
the denial of notice or a hearing when slots are not "available." And
since this would be, by far, the largest and most obvious basis for
potential beneficiaries to be denied services-if CMS believed this to
be a legitimate reason for such denial-this omission should be
viewed as a telling contradiction to the theory that the statute's use of
the language "feasible alternatives available under the waiver" is
meant to equate with "open slots."
C. Applying the Reasonable Promptness Obligation Provides
Consistency with Congress 's Anti-Discrimination Legislation and
Policies Promoting Deinstitutionalization
1. The Tension Between the ADA 's "Integration Mandate" and
Makin
Giving effect to the "reasonable promptness" language in waiver
programs would require a restructuring of state Medicaid programs,
112. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,532, 48,535-36 (Oct. 1, 1981).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Cf Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (sustaining District Court's grant of an
injunction and holding that "individuals have two explicitly identified rights-(a) the right to be
informed of alternatives to traditional, long-term institutional care, and (b) the right to choose among
those alternatives"); Michele P. v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769 (E.D. Ky. 2005).
2o01
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 831 2009-2010
010] I I  KIN  A II 
r t ti ns   i i  t ti  ri    
 i    part 431, Subpart E.112 
831 
 e  t li tion  l  
 t  t     
 t    i     
it -based , ti  l    
   . I 13   f 
l    i   
s,    i s l  l r 
.,,114  i ti s, t 
 t s," ,"  r e t ti ns,"  
   for denying individual choice. I IS 
 ,     
    ilable."  
t    
l i  i s-if e    
  l-this   
  ti  '   
i le   
   
.  le tness li tion i es 
 '  iscri ination l ti n  
i s ti  tit tionalization 
.  ' t ration  
 
 l   
  
. ,  t. I, ). 
[d. 
/d. 
liS   '  
ls ts-{ t  i t t   
nn  t nn i tit ti   
 .  ( . .  
29
Schwalb: Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii:  The Right of Medicaid Beneficiari
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
as services expand to meet assessed need. Would such an expansion
be an unwarranted additional burden on states? Such an expansion is
in fact consistent with long-standing statutory precedents. It has been
the reasoning and the holding of Makin that has conflicted with these
statutes.
The Makin court's interpretation avoiding the reasonable
promptness provision causes a basic conflict with the ADA's
"integration mandate," which the court itself appears to have
acknowledged."l 6 The ADA generally requires states and other
governmental entities to make "reasonable accommodations" to their
programs to make them accessible to the disabled. Olmstead, decided
under the ADA, held that institutionalizing individuals unnecessarily,
i.e., withholding home or community-based medical treatment that is
safe and appropriate to the individual, is a form of segregation
prohibited by the ADA's integration mandate." 7 At the same time,
Justice Ginsburg's plurality opinion recognized that cost
considerations might make immediate deinstitutionalization too
costly to be considered a "reasonable modification." "Sensibly
construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-
modifications regulation would allow the State to show that, in the
allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the Plaintiffs
would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has
undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse
population of persons with mental disabilities." ' 1 8 The Court held that
a state could meet the integration mandate of the ADA without
immediate relief by having a "comprehensive, effectively working
plan" to provide services."
19
When Medicaid's "reasonable promptness" requirement is
interpreted to be not applicable to waiver programs, substantial
questions arise about Medicaid program's compliance with the
116. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-35 (D. Haw. 1999).
117. Cramer v. Chiles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding the use of Medicaid
funds to continue to provide services in institutions and nursing homes without permitting Medicaid
funded community placement violates the ADA).
118. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,604 (1999).
119. Id. at 605-06.
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ADA's integration mandate. Allowing states to set "population
limits" in their waiver programs that are below their real need leaves
individuals in institutions unable to move to non-restrictive
environments in the community. Other individuals, unable to receive
community-based services, are compelled to become
institutionalized. As seen below, courts that have found population
caps as authorized under Medicaid have struggled with this issue.
Makin considered the possibility of mandating increases in the
waiver program to comply with the ADA's requirement that
programs make "reasonable modification" to avoid discriminatory
effects.' 20 Ultimately, the court determined it lacked material facts
sufficient to rule on the question on summary judgment.' 2' Although
Makin never reached the question, the court in Braddock did.
Initially, it acknowledged the tension between the statutes, but left an
unsatisfactory resolution when it simply held that compliance with
the Medicaid statute dispensed with the need to comply with the
ADA:
Thus, to the extent that the statutes point in opposite directions,
one of them must prevail. In this case, the Medicaid statute
should receive the laurel wreath because, "[w]here there is no
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled
... by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment"[;]
... "[i]t is a well established tenet of statutory construction that a
specific statute controls over a general statute." If Arc [the
Plaintiffs] were correct, the general ADA injunction against
discrimination would repeal the specific Medicaid provisions for
the limited waiver programs. That cannot be. In so stating, we do
not mean that the ADA has nothing whatsoever to say about a
state's obligation to provide community-based services to the
120. Makin, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-35.
121. Id. at 1035.
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disabled .... We merely state that the ADA does not overcome
the specific cap provision in the Medicaid statute.
22
The initial Braddock opinion was withdrawn after a rehearing was
granted.123 In the second Braddock opinion, the court simply found
that even though the state had a population cap on its waiver
program, it nonetheless had a "comprehensive, effectively working
plan," the defense that Justice Ginsburg's opinion offered in
Olmstead.124 The Braddock court looked to the growth of the
program over the years to find a "comprehensive, effectively working
plan."
125
Washington's HCBS program is substantial in size, providing
integrated care to nearly 10,000 Medicaid-eligible disabled
persons in the state .... The waiver program is full, and there is
a waiting list that admits new participants when slots open up.
. . .[A]ll Medicaid-eligible disabled persons will have the
opportunity to participate in the program once space becomes
available, based solely on their mental-health needs and position
on the waiting list.
Further, the size of Washington's HCBS program increased at
the state's request from 1,227 slots in 1983 to 7,597 slots in 1997
to 9,977 slots beginning in 1998 .... The annual state budget for
community-based disability programs such as HCBS more than
doubled from $167 million in fiscal year 1994, to $350 million in
fiscal year 2001, despite significant cutbacks or minimal budget
growth for many state agencies .... During the same period, the
budget for institutional programs remained constant, while the
institutionalized population declined by 20% .... Today, the
statewide institutionalized population is less than 1,000.
The Department's Division of Developmental Disabilities
(DDD) has also seen its biennial budget grow steadily from $750
122. Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 403 F.3d 641,644 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 616.
124. Id. at 621-22 (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605).
125. Id.
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million in 1995 to over $1 billion in 1999, making it one of the
fastest growing budgets within the Department . . . .Family
support services, given to families of DDD clients living at
home, have grown even faster, benefitting from a 250% budget
growth over five years .... There is thus no indication that the
state is neglecting its responsibilities to the HCBS program
relative to other programs. 1
26
The same holding was made in Sanchez v. Johnson, another Ninth
Circuit case decided a few months before.1 27 Like the quoted section
above, Sanchez also found a comprehensive, effective plan based on
substantial increases in funding and case loads for community
placement.1
28
Although these opinions cite indications of past progress, they do
so vaguely without setting forth an objective level of progress
necessary for a state to be deemed to have a "comprehensive,
effectively working plan."'129 The "plans" cited by the Ninth Circuit
provide little indicia of future progress, contradicting the notion of a
"plan" in its ordinary sense. The Third Circuit case, Frederick L. v.
Department of Public Welfare, by contrast, rejected reliance of past
progress alone in deinstitutionalization as evidence of a
"comprehensive, effective, working plan."' 30
[W]hat is needed at the very least is a plan that is communicated
in some manner. The District Court accepted the
Commonwealth's reliance on past progress without requiring a
commitment by it to take all reasonable steps to continue that
126. Id. at 621 (citations omitted).
127. Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005).
128. Id. ("California's expenditures for individuals in community settings increased 196% [between
1991 and 2001], while caseload ... increased fifty-five percent in the same period.... [Between 1996
and 2000], California reduced its institution population by twenty percent. DDS has also budgeted 42
new Community Care Facilities and ten new Intermediate Care Facilities, and anticipates a reduction in
institutionalization that would allow it to close at least one Developmental Center by 2007.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
129. Id.; Braddock, 427 F.3d at 621.
130. Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487, 500 (3d Cir. 2004), remanded, No. 02-
3721, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17810 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2004), vacated, 422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005).
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progress. Under the circumstances presented here, our reading of
Olmstead would require no less. 3'
While past progress as in Braddock and future assurances as in
Frederick L. may be indicators of a plan, they leave vague and
unanswered the two most pertinent questions necessary for a court to
determine the effectiveness of a state "plan": (1) the factual question
of how long must individuals wait to receive needed community
based services; and (2) the legal question of whether this length of
time is "reasonable." A "plan" that cannot provide at least a rough or
approximate timeframe that services will be provided to beneficiaries
that are eligible and dependent upon them is really only a "plan" in
name. Without answers to these questions, the ADA's integration
mandate looks less like a "mandate" and more like merely an
aspiration.
Of course, if the "reasonable promptness" provision is read into the
waiver program, the ADA's integration mandate is readily achieved
for many of those with disabilities who depend on Medicaid and are
eligible for the waiver. When a state provides waiver services in
"reasonably prompt" timeframes, it seems difficult to conceive how
the state would not also meet the "reasonable modification"
requirement of the ADA's integration mandate. The symmetry of this
construction is itself compelling. Because applying the Medicaid's
reasonable promptness provision in waivers would best effectuate the
ADA's integration requirement, and avoidance of the reasonable
promptness language is likely to frustrate it, this interpretation,
flowing from the statute's plain language, should be the first and
most favored interpretation. "When two statutes are capable of
coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
Congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as
effective."' 32 The ADA is clearly a statute of broad general
131. Id.
132. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551 (1974)); see also Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 519 (1950) (holding that for
two overlapping statutes covering the same subject matter, the interpretation that satisfies both statutes
should be given effect, absent a showing of impossibility); Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor, Ltd., 449
[Vol. 26:3
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applicability. It is intended to "invoke the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.'' 33 It
seems clear that Congress intended to reach all elements of society
and government activity in passing the ADA. Undoubtedly this
includes state Medicaid programs.
2. Including the Reasonable Promptness Obligation in Waiver
Programs Is Consistent with Congress 's Lengthy History
Promoting Deinstitutionalization
Beyond these general principles of statutory construction, the
history of Congressional anti-discriminatory legislation suggests that
making waiver services available to those eligible with reasonable
promptness best comports with Congressional intent. The obligation
of Medicaid programs to modify their programs to avoid
discriminatory policies against the disabled did not merely arise with
the ADA, but arises from earlier precedents. The ADA was
essentially an extension of the Rehabilitation Act, 134 which prohibits
recipients of federal funding from discriminating against the disabled,
including state Medicaid programs. 135 The ADA extended the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act throughout
American society, irrespective of whether the program or activity
received federal funds. And generally, the ADA's and the
Rehabilitation Act's substantive terms are the same. 136
When the ADA was passed, the legal obligation upon Medicaid
programs to avoid discrimination against the disabled had already
been long established by the Rehabilitation Act. 137 Thus, all state and
F.3d 286, 301 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772, 788 (1981)).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2006).
134. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
135. Id.
136. Cf Barnes v. Goorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184-85 (2002); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052
(9th Cir. 2002); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1995).
137. Application of Certain Cross-Cutting Statutes Under the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, 6
U.S. OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 83 (1982), available at 1982 WL 170674.
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local government applicants for federal financial assistance were, and
are, required to provide assurances that they will abide by the
Rehabilitation Act's anti-discrimination provisions. 38 In fact, all
Medicaid state plans must contain specific assurances that the state's
Medicaid program will comply with the Rehabilitation Act.'39 By the
time the waiver program came into existence in 1981, state Medicaid
programs were already required to provide assurances that they
would comply with the Act's anti-discriminatory provisions.
Not only had states long been required to operate their Medicaid
program in a manner that avoided discrimination against the disabled,
it was already established law that this compliance meant avoiding
unnecessary institutionalization. The Rehabilitation Act's
implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice
in 1981 contain its own integration mandate, substantially the same
as in the ADA regulations: "Recipients shall administer programs and
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified handicapped person."'140 Thus, the integration mandate (the
ADA's version of which would ultimately be the subject of
Olmstead) already existed in the Rehabilitation Act when Congress
passed the ADA, and was already a condition for the receipt of state
Medicaid funds. 14 1 The ADA specifically states that its implementing
regulations should be consistent with the Rehabilitation Act
regulations.142 In actuality, the legislative history of the ADA records
that the integration mandate received bipartisan endorsement. The
majority report referenced the integration mandate in the education
138. OMB's Standard Form 424B requires an applicant to certify that he or she "will comply with all
Federal statutes relating to non-discrimination. These include, but are not limited to... (c) Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (29 U.S.C. §794), which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of handicaps. ; see also U. S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT BUDGET CIRCULAR A-102
[hereinafter OMB].
139. See Letter from Health Care Fin. Admin., Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to State
Medicaid Director (Aug. 3, 1998).
140. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d); see Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 332-33 (3d Cir. 1995).
141. This assurance is typically provided in Section 7.2 of each state plan for medical assistance
(Medicaid).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2006). Note that the statute mistakenly refers to regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare instead of the Department of Justice.
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context.143 Support for the integration mandate echoed in the minority
report.144
In addition, the "integration mandate," while enforced as part of
the ADA in the Olmstead decision, followed a legislative judgment
made a decade before as part of the Social Services Block Grant.
145
Its purpose tracks closely the integration mandate as applied to
institutionalization. The specific language of the statute states that its
goal is "preventing or reducing inappropriate institutional care by
providing for community-based care, home based care, or other
forms of less intense care.' 46 When did this provision come about? It
came about in 1981, as part of OBRA 1981, the same legislation that
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1396n, Medicaid's community based waiver
program, both becoming parts of the Social Security Act, 14 7 Medicaid
being Title XIX, 148 and the Social Services Block Grant, Title XX. 
149
As part of the same legislation, and as part of the same subject
matter, the two provisions should be read together as an overarching
consistent expression of Congressional intent to eliminate
unnecessary institutionalization in federally-funded health care.
In light of this history, it cannot be considered a surprising or novel
change in a state's legal obligation to enforce the plain language of
the Medicaid Act to provide alternatives to institutional care with
"reasonable promptness." The obligation for states to offer non-
institutional alternative services for their disabled residents was fixed
before the Medicaid waiver program. This program, along with the
Social Security Block Grant program, merely provided funding
143. "The school bus transportation provided to children with disabilities must be provided in the
most integrated setting possible." H. REP. No. 101-485 (II) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.A.A.N. 267, 369.
144. "As with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, integrated services are essential to accomplishing
the purposes of Title II. As stated by Judge Mansmann in ADAPT v. Skinner, 'the goal is to eradicat[e]
the invisibility of the handicapped.' Separate but equal services do not accomplish this central goal and
should be rejected." H. REP. No. 101-485 (II), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 267, 473 (quoting
ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989) (Mansmann, J., dissenting)).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2006).
146. Id
147. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2352, 95 Stat. 357 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f(1981)).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2006).
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sources for states to effectuate Congress's anti-discriminatory
mandates on state programs and services.
From the Social Services Block Grant, the Rehabilitation Act, and
the ADA, Congress has repeatedly reafflrmed intentions to
deinstitutionalize our health system for our disabled residents. As
seen above, discord with this policy arose not from Congress, but
from the Makin decision and its interpretation of CMS's regulation.
Since then, various circuit courts' 50 have issued decisions along the
lines of Makin, binding in those circuits, and CMS itself has clouded
the issue through informal statements made in letters issued to state
Medicaid Directors that appear to confuse CMS's administrative
requirement in waiver applications, as asserted in this article, with the
statutory mandates of the Medicaid Act. 151 Such informal guidance,
not having gone though the administrative rule-making procedure set
out under the Administrative Procedure Act, 152 and without a source
of statutory authority, are neither controlling nor are they
persuasive. 153
IV. REVIEWING THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS THAT THE MAK!N
COURT FOUND "AMBIGUOUS" AND AUTHORIZED AVOIDING THE
"REASONABLE PROMPTNESS" OBLIGATION
What should one make of the statutory provisions cited by Makin
as ambiguous enough to give rise to an "interpretive gap"-which it
150. Language in the Sixth Circuit case of Brown v. Tenn. Dep 't of Fin. & Admin., 561 F.3d 542, 548
n.4 (6th Cir. 2009), supports Makin although the issue was not technically before the Court. See also
CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 71
(2002).
151. See, e.g., Letter from Health Care Fin. Admin., Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to State
Medicaid Director, at 8-9 (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://www.cms.gov/smdl/downloads/
smd011001 a.pdf ("May a State reduce the total number of people to be served under a HCBS waiver?"
Yes. Under 42 C.F.R. 441.303(f)(6), states are required to specify the number of unduplicated recipients
to be served under HCBS waivers.).
152. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
153. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995) ("We find nothing either in the Act or elsewhere
indicating that Congress intended to authorize the FTC to create this exception from the Act's
coverage-an exception that falls outside the range of reasonable interpretations of the Act's expressed
language."); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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filled with its interpretation of CMS's regulation? 15 4 As noted earlier,
the first reference, 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(9), does not appear to make
such limits mandatory, but makes them permissive, "in the case of
any waiver which contains a limit on the number of individuals
.... "155 Because such limits are optional, the language should not be
viewed to override the mandatory language of the "reasonable
promptness" obligation. A state using "limits" can give effect to both
provisions by setting limits to approximate needs.
156
The second statutory reference to a limitation is indeed curious, but
is considered to apply to the "model" waiver program: "The
Secretary shall not limit to fewer than 200 the number of individuals
in the State who may receive home and community-based services
under a waiver under this subsection."'1 57 It prohibits the Secretary
from denying state model waiver applications, if they have
populations below 200 slots. This provision was, in fact, directly
addressed by CMS in its 1994 regulatory history. In distinguishing
the requirements of a model waiver from the general waiver program,
the explanation offered further undermined the reasoning of Makin:
This amendment restricts the Secretary's power to limit the
number of persons who can receive home and community-based
waivers to no lower than 200. Again, in light of the history of the
waiver program and the legislative history of the provision, we
interpret this amendment to restrict the Secretary's power to
limit the number of participants in the model waiver program
only. Historically, there has been no limit on the number of
participants in the regular home and community-based waiver
programs, whereas there has been a 50 person Federally-
imposed limit on the number ofpersons who can participate in a
model waiver. Also Section 411(k)(10)(A) was aimed only at
model waivers. We believe, therefore, that this provision enables
the Secretary to limit the number of participants in a model home
154. See discussion supra Part I.B.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(9) (2006).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (2006).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(10).
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and community-based program to 200 persons, or any amount
above 200. Through these regulations, the Secretary has opted to
impose a maximum limit of 200 persons for any state waiver
program On an individual State basis, an approved State plan
may contain a maximum limit that is lower than 200. Thus, no
State may serve any more than 200 persons, but any State may
be limited to a lower number as approved in its waiver program
158There is no comparable limit on regular waiver programs ....
Could Congress have really wanted everyone who could meet the
cost neutrality criteria to get the option of getting alternative waiver
services? It appears that CMS initially thought so, recognizing that
Congress intended to cast the broadest possible net:
The House Report accompanying the House Omnibus
Reconciliation Bill (H. Rep. 97-158, p. 316) notes that it has
been estimated that a quarter of the current nursing home
population do not need full-time residential care. Many elderly,
disabled and chronically ill persons do not need full-time,
residential care. Many elderly, disabled and chronically ill
persons live in institutions not for medical reasons, but because
of the paucity of health and social services available to them in
their homes of communities, and the individual's inability to pay
for those services or to have them covered by Medicaid when
they do exist.159
Section 1915(c) of the Act has a target population consisting of
beneficiaries who are or would be eligible for Medicaid in an
institutional setting. The statute is not explicit on how
beneficiaries are to be determined eligible for new services under
the waiver. However, we believe that Congress did not intend
that there would be a smaller population eligible for Medicaid for
158. 59 Fed. Reg. 37,702, 37,711 (Sept. 25, 1994) (emphasis added); see also Bryson v. Shumway,
308 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2002).
159. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,532 (Oct. 1, 1981).
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home and community-based services than for institutional long-
term care.
160
Perhaps Congress may not have fully appreciated the growth and
popularity of the programs. But if the Medicaid Act already
mandated that those states providing institutional care to all those
requiring such services with reasonable promptnessl 61 -with the
majority of the costs being paid out of the federal government-why
would Congress not want states to make equally accessible to such
beneficiaries the considerably less costly and more popular-and
more consistent with the ADA-waiver services as an alternative? If
Congress could have been a bit more explicit in making this now-
critically important program part of the Medicaid benefit, it is just as
compelling to ask, if Congress wanted to create the first exception to
the entitlement program, would it not have been more clear about
such a precedent-changing policy? It could have quite simply waived
that "such assistance be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals."'162 But it did not; and the regulation that has
served as the basis for Makin to find such caps asserts no pretense or
basis for such an exception.
163
Why would Congress reference numerical limits at all in the statute
if states nonetheless have to provide services with "reasonable
promptness"? These numbers might serve as planning devices for the
purpose of developing provider capacity; the population limits might
serve as vehicles for developing reasonable standards in care, 164 or to
allow for capacity utilization targets---consistent with other Medicaid
provisions.165 Or the "population limits" might be simply one way,
perhaps the most obvious way, to demonstrate that the waiver
program is meeting the "cost neutrality" objective set by Congress.
Since the statute requires that cost effectiveness be demonstrated on a
160. Id.
161. See Doe v. Childs, 136 F.3d 709, 718 (11th Cir. 1998).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(8) (2006).
163. See discussion supra Part II.C.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(22)(D) (2006).
165. Id. § 1396a(3)(A).
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per capita basis, population limits appear to be the most facile and
direct way to demonstrate that the state's waiver program is operating
cost effectively on a per capita basis, without necessarily prohibiting
increases. 166 In any case, even if these cost estimates are exceeded by
a state, it is not clear that the state can be in any way penalized:
The Secretary may not require as a condition of approval of a
waiver under this section under paragraph (2)(D), that the actual
total expenditures for home and community-based services under
the waiver (and a claim for Federal financial participation in
expenditures for the services) cannot exceed the approved
estimates for these services. The Secretary may not deny Federal
financial payment with respect to services under such a waiver
on the ground that, in order to comply with paragraph 2(D), a
State failed to comply with such a requirement.
167
If Congress wanted "hard" population limits on the waiver
program, it probably would not have prohibited the Secretary from
limiting federal financial participation in states that exceed these
limits. Much more likely than constraining the Secretary from
denying funding, Congress would have strictly limited federal
financial contribution to states to the specified cap amount. Thus, the
reference to the limits, whatever Congress intended by them, does not
support the further inference that, despite the statute's plain language,
Congress intended these services to be denied indefinitely to eligible
beneficiaries.
V. THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: ADDITIONAL STATUTORY
AUTHORITY FOR STATES TO PROVIDE COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES
wiTH EXPLICIT POPULATION LIMITS
Congress appears to have tried to address the limited availability of
community-based services in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
166. Id. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
167. Id. § 1396n(c)(6) (emphasis added).
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(DRA). 168 Among the many significant changes the DRA made to
Medicaid, it authorizes states to offer a new type of community-based
services, but with several critical features that distinguish it from the
waiver programs authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c). The new
program, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i), permits states to offer
community-based services to individuals that do not have medical
needs severe enough to meet an institutional level of care, such as
nursing home or hospital levels of care.' 69 Accordingly, it does away
with the "cost neutrality" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c). 7 °
And while 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) authorizes targeting services to
individuals with particular conditions, diseases or disabilities (such as
individuals with developmental disabilities), the new program does
not authorize states to limit services to individuals with particular
conditions.' 7 1 Significantly, § 1396n(i) explicitly authorizes states to
limit the number of participants in this new waiver program.' 72 The
conference report to the DRA, in explaining the new community
based service provisions, discusses, but did not amend, the pre-
existing waiver program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c). In describing the
existing 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) waiver, it also interjects upon the issue
that has been the focus of this article.
Medicaid's home and community-based services (HCBS)
waivers.. . allow states to provide home and community-based
services to Medicaid beneficiaries who would otherwise need the
level of care provided in a nursing facility, intermediate care
facility for persons with mental retardation (ICF-MR) or
hospital .... As part of the waiver, states may define services
that will be offered, target a specific population (e.g., individuals
with developmental disabilities) or a specific geographic region,
168. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
169. Id. § 6086.
170. Id.
171. See CMS comments to implementing regulations. 73 Fed. Reg. 18,676, 18,691 (Apr. 4, 2008).
172. Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6086, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
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and limit the number of waiver participants (resulting in a
waiting list in many states) (emphasis added). 173
What effect does the statement in the Conference Report have on
the analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) waivers? Very little. First, as a
statement in a conference report rather than in the actual statute, the
conference language itself does not work a legal effect. Statutory
analysis is focused on the language and terms of the statute.
Generalized statements in legislative history not "anchored" to
particular statutory language offer little for a court to consider in the
process of interpreting statutes. 174 "While a committee report may
ordinarily be used to interpret unclear language contained in a statute,
a committee report cannot serve as an independent statutory source
having the force and effect of law"'175 Second, even if the language
was viewed as an expression of a generalized statement of
"legislative intent" of the waiver statute (irrespective of the actual
language it enacted), it is simply too remote in time to be given any
consideration. If the conference report had been submitted in
reference to the original waiver legislation, it perhaps would be
suggestive of the then-Congress's intentions with respect to that
program. But coming nearly twenty-five years after the waiver
program was enacted, the 2006 Conference Committee was hardly in
a better position than anyone else to divine what the then-voting
legislators that enacted the waiver program intended when they
passed the legislation, even assuming this was the report author's
intent. As often noted, "subsequent legislative history provides an
extremely hazardous basis for inferring the meaning of a
173. H. REP. No. 109-362, at 296 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
174. Nw. Envtl. Def. v. Bonneville Power, 477 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Shannon v.
United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994)).
175. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(emphasis omitted). "The principle that committee report language has no binding legal effect is
grounded in the text of the Constitution and in the structure of separated powers the Constitution
created. Article I, section 7, clause 2 of the Constitution is explicit about the manner in which Congress
can take legally binding action." Bonneville Power, 477 F.3d at 684; accord Miedema v. Maytag Corp.,
450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11 th Cir. 2006) (arguing that a statute's silence coupled with a sentence in a
legislative committee report un-tethered to any statutory language does not cause a change in the law).
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Congressional enactment."' !16  Third, as the 109th Congress's
"interpretation" of the Medicaid waiver statute, it has no legal
significance. Congress enacts statutes, but interpreting statutes is not
within its constitutional powers. 177 "Committee report's statements
regarding earlier statutes cannot be 'authoritative interpretations'
because it is the function of the courts, and not the Legislature to say
what an enacted statute means."'
78
The tools for interpreting the meaning of 42 U.S.C
§ 1396n(c)-the statutory language, the Agency's interpretation of
the language, the judicial doctrines used in statutory interpretation,
and the relevant legislative history-were fixed long ago. This, and
future committee reports do not meaningfully alter the analysis of the
statute unless, and until, accompanied by legislation amending the
relevant statutory language. Rather than intending a change in the
law, or changing the analysis of the original law, the statement in the
conference report may be deemed merely as the report author's
recognition of the majority view of the law that clearly follows
Makin.179 However, if Makin was improperly decided, and its legal
conclusions are determined to not withstand authoritative legal
analysis, the report does not abate or absolve such errors.
Notwithstanding the lack of legal effect of the language of the
Conference Report, does the failure to change the statute after Makin
reflect "legislative acquiescence" to the position espoused by Makin?
There is scant basis for such an interpretation, as ascribing intentions
176. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980) (citing
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969)); see also MAlMmEN, supra note 150, at 71
(referring to subsequent legislative history as "the least persuasive" form of legislative history).
177. While the power of judicial review may originate as a constitutional doctrine with Marbury v.
Madison, as a doctrine of jurisprudence of the separate authority of courts and legislatures, it has
precedents in both the common law and civil law traditions of Europe. See JOHN CHAPMAN GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 170-72 (2d ed. 1921).
178. Grey Panthers Advocacy Comm. v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988)).
179. This view has become so dominant that in the recent case Brown v. Tenn, Dep't of Fin. &
Admin., 561 F.3d 542, 548 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed an
anticipated challenge to the state's wait list without deeming it necessary to cite authority. "We
acknowledge that enrollment in the waiver program is capped at the number of slots proposed by the
state and approved by CMS, and we do not take the Plaintiffs to contend that Tennessee has an
unlimited duty to enroll eligible individuals in its HCBS waiver. To the extent that is plaintiffs' position,
we reject it now." Id.
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or meaning from Congressional inaction is an inherently unreliable
exercise. "[C]ongressional silence lacks persuasive significance
.... The verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a
statutory gloss that is otherwise impermissible . . . . Congressional
inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or
paralysis ... 81
From the passage of a new form of community based services in
the DRA one may perhaps surmise that Congress wanted to give
states the option to expand community based services to populations
that do not have access to them under the original waiver program. 1
82
And although the DRA authorizes wait lists, they are in a
significantly different context. These community-based services are
not subject to the same inherent limitations found in the 42 U.S.C
§ 1396n(c) of cost neutrality, and with eligibility limited to those
meeting an institutional level of care. While such a wait list may be
authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i), that may not be the end of the
matter with respect to whether a Medicaid program is compliant with
federal law. This point was noted by CMS in its meticulously
reasoned preamble to the new rule:
A State electing to use a waiting list must develop policies for
establishing and maintaining the list, if it elects to establish a
limit to the number of individuals served.... [W]e would require
the State to assure that its policies are published with opportunity
for comment, equitable, and meet all applicable state and federal
requirements. Those requirements are not limited to Medicaid
provisions such as timely evaluation and right to a fair hearing;
civil rights protections such as the State's compliance with the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. and, in some
180. MAMMEN, supra note 150, at 71.
181. Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 123 (1994) (internal citations omitted)).
182. Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6086, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
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As a consequence of Makin, Medicaid waiver services are a
judicially-created oddity in the Medicaid program. Up until the new
waiver service program of the DRA, which arguably is itself a legacy
of Makin, Medicaid's community-based waiver program was the only
service among a lengthy list of services authorized under the
Medicaid program that states can elect to deny to individuals who are
qualified and eligible to receive them, as effectively, a "non-
entitlement" service. Despite this, the waiver program is among the
most popular programs, and by its very definition, cost-effective. As
a result, Medicaid recipients are often caught between a service they
do not want, and a service they cannot get. This uncomfortable state
of affairs disproportionately harms those with disabilities nearly four
decades after Congress enacted anti-disability discrimination
legislation and called for the integration of the disabled in society.
To say that waiver services must be provided with "reasonable
promptness" does not mean that services must be immediate, but is
suggestive of an individualized factual inquiry. Reasonable
promptness generally means ninety (90) days. 184 Under the statute, it
appears that states may set caps, or may not. But if they do, giving
effect to the reasonable promptness provision means requiring the
caps to be based on reasonable estimates of need for the services in
the state, and eliminating the practice of denying services for eligible
individuals for undetermined, indefinite periods. Applying the
reasonable promptness language would go a long way towards
bringing the promise of Olmstead to fruition and bringing to an end a
multi-generational struggle to curtail the use of health facilities as
vehicles for segregating those with disabilities.
183. 73 Fed. Reg. 18,676, 18,679 (Apr. 4, 2008).
184. Doe v. Childs, 136 F.3d 709 (11 th Cir. 1998).
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As the American health system moves from an institutional model
to a less costly and more consumer-directed focus, Makin stands as a
stubborn anachronism. It limits consumer choice and perpetuates the
discriminatory effects of an institutionalized health care system that
Congress has sought to relegate to the past. It is time that Makin's
holding be reconsidered. 1
85
185. Neil Johnson, Home Care for Seniors Has New Urgency, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Jan. 6,
2008, http://www.startribune.com/business/12995121.html. Ironically Hawaii appears to be one of the
few places where Makin has no lingering effect, at least with respect to the developmentally disabled.
The state is now one of the few that has ended all care for the developmentally disabled in institutions,
and only provides community-based services. It is reported to have no one waiting for services under its
waiver. See BRAGDON, supra note 33, at 5.
[VoL 26:3
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APPENDIX I
The agency must furnish HCFA with sufficient information to
support the assurances required by § 441.302. Except as HCFA may
otherwise specify for particular waivers, the information must consist
of the following, at a minimum:
(a) A description of the safeguards necessary to protect the health
and welfare of recipients. This information must include a copy
of the standards established by the State for facilities that are
covered by section 1616(e) of the Act.
(b) A description of the records and information that will be
maintained to support financial accountability.
(c) A description of the agency's plan for the evaluation and
reevaluation of recipients, including--(1) A description of who
will make these evaluations and how they will be made; (2) A
copy of the evaluation instrument to be used; (3) the agency's
procedure to ensure the maintenance of written documentation
on all evaluations and reevaluations; and (4) the agency's
procedure to ensure reevaluations of need at regular intervals.
(d) A description of the agency's plan for informing eligible
recipients of the feasible alternatives available under the waiver
and allowing recipients to choose either institutional services or
home and community-based services.
(e) An explanation of how the agency will apply the applicable
provisions regarding the post-eligibility treatment of income and
resources of those individuals receiving home and community-
based services who are eligible under a special income level
(included in section 435.217 of this chapter).
(f) An explanation with supporting documentation satisfactory to
HCFA of how the agency estimated the per capita expenditures
for services. This information must include but is not limited to
the estimated utilization rates and costs for services included in
the plan, the number of actual and projected beds in Medicaid
20101
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certified SNFs, ICFs, and ICF/MRs by type, and evidence of the
need for additional bed capacity in the absence of the waiver.
(1) The annual average per capita expenditure estimate of the
cost of home and community-based and other Medicaid services
under the waiver must not exceed the annual average per capita
expenditures of the cost of services in the absence of a waiver.




A = the estimated annual number of beneficiaries who would
receive the level of care provided in an SNF, ICF, or ICF/MR
with the waiver.
B = the estimated annual Medicaid expenditure for SNF, ICF, or
ICF/MR care per eligible Medicaid user with the waiver.
C = the estimated annual number of beneficiaries who would
receive home and community-based services under the waiver.
D = the estimated annual Medicaid expenditure for home and
community-based services per eligible Medicaid user.
F = the estimated annual number of beneficiaries who would
likely receive the level of care provided in an SNF, ICF, or
ICF/MR in the absence of the waiver.
G = the estimated annual Medicaid expenditure per eligible
Medicaid user of such institutional care in the absence of the
waiver.
H = the estimated annual number of beneficiaries who would
receive any of the noninstitutional, long-term care services
otherwise provided under the State plan as an alternative to
institutional care.
I = the estimated annual Medicaid expenditure per eligible
Medicaid user of the noninstitutional services referred to in H.
[Vol. 26:3
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The symbol "less than/equal to" is intended to mean that the
result of the left side of the left side of the equation must be less
than or equal to the result of the right side of the equation.
A' = the estimated annual number of beneficiaries referred to in
A who would receive any of the acute care services otherwise
provided under the State plan.
B' = the estimated annual Medicaid expenditure per eligible
Medicaid user of the acute care services referred to in A'.
C' = the estimated annual number of beneficiaries referred to in
C who would receive any of the acute care services otherwise
provided under the State plan.
D' = the estimated annual Medicaid expenditure per eligible
Medicaid user of acute care services referred to in C'.
F' = the estimated annual number of beneficiaries referred to in F
who would receive any of the acute care services otherwise
provided under the State plan.
G' = the estimated annual Medicaid expenditure per eligible
Medicaid user of the acute care services referred to in F'.
(2) For purposes of the equation, acute care services means all
services otherwise provided under the State plan that are neither
SNF, ICF, or ICF/MR services, nor the noninstitutional, long-
term care services referred to in H.
(3) Data on the estimated annual number of beneficiaries and
expenditures for those who would otherwise receive an SNF,
ICF, or ICF/MR level of care is required for all three types of
institutions only if the waiver request provides that each of these
groups will be offered home and community-based services. For
example, if the request does not include persons who would
otherwise receive an ICF/MR level of care, the State is not
required to furnish data on that group.
(4) The data must show the estimated annual number of
beneficiaries who will be deinstitutionalized from certified SNFs,
ICFs and ICF/MRs because they would receive home and
community-based services under the waiver, and the estimated
annual number of beneficiaries whose admission to such
institutions would be diverted or deflected because of the waiver
20101
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services. For the latter group, the State's evaluation process
required by section 441.303(c) must provide for a more detailed
description of their evaluation and screening procedures for
recipients to assure that waiver services will be limited to
persons who would otherwise receive the level of care provided
in an SNF, ICF, or ICF/MR.
(g) Except as HCFA may otherwise specify for particular
waivers, the agency must provide for an independent assessment
of its waiver that evaluates the quality of care provided, access to
care, and cost-effectiveness. The results of the assessment must
be submitted to HCFA at least 90 days prior to the third
anniversary of the approved waiver period and cover at least the
first 24 months of the waiver.
[50 FR 10027, March 13, 1985; 50 FR 25080, June 17, 1985]
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